Litigation & Enforcement Actions – Page 3 – Consumer Financial Services Watch

Expounding on Arbitrability: The Seventh Circuit Joins the Growing Ranks of Circuit Courts Finding that Courts Presumptively Decide the Availability of Class Arbitration

Nov 08 2018

By Andrew C. Glass, Robert W. Sparkes, III, Elma Delic, Roger L. Smerage

The U.S. Supreme Court has issued numerous decisions over the past decade addressing arbitration agreements. [1] In one of the Roberts Court’s first forays into the arbitration arena, the Court held that class or collective arbitration is only available where the parties have affirmatively agreed to resolve their disputes through such procedures. [2] But who determines whether the parties have so agreed — a court or an arbitrator?

Does “Any Defendant” Really Mean “Any Defendant”?

Oct 04 2018

The U.S. Supreme Court to Address Whether Counterclaim Defendants Can Remove Class Action Claims Under CAFA

By Ryan M. Tosi, Scott G. Ofrias

On September 27, 2018, the United States Supreme Court granted the petition for writ for certiorari in Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, No. 17-1471 (“Home Depot”), to address two issues: (1) whether, under the federal Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), a third-party defendant can remove to federal court class action claims that are brought as counterclaims by the defendant/third-party plaintiff; and (2) whether the Supreme Court’s holding in Shamrock Oil & Gas Co. v. Sheets [1] — that an original plaintiff may not remove a counterclaim against it — extends to third-party counterclaim defendants. [2] Resolution of these issues by the Supreme Court may have significant implications for any counterclaim or third-party defendant (and possibly any counterclaim defendant) seeking to remove a class action or a mass action from state to federal court.

California Continues Its Role as a Privacy Vanguard: California Consumer Privacy Act Of 2018

Aug 03 2018

By Julia B. Jacobson, Jeffrey S. King, Alidad Vakili

On June 28, 2018, California Governor Jerry Brown signed into law the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (“CCPA”).[2] CCPA grants new privacy rights to Californian residents and applies a notice and consent framework to most businesses operating in California that collect personal information from those residents.

Dodd-Frank Reform 2.0

Jul 11 2018

By: Daniel F. C. Crowley, Bruce J. Heiman, William A. Kirk, Karishma Shah Page, Dean A. Brazier, Eric A. Love, Eli M. Schooley

Recent activity in Congress suggests that the return from the July 4th recess will see a continued push to reform the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) before year’s end. This alert provides an overview of the current state of play and the most likely outcome.

Requirements for Massachusetts Homestead Exemption: Can Debtors Exempt Principal Residence Occasionally Rented as Short-Term Lodging?

Jun 25 2018

By: Sean R. Higgins and David A. Mawhinney

Should a Massachusetts homeowner be allowed to claim a homestead exemption in a principal residence that is also used for business or other commercial purposes? Answering this question several years ago as a matter of first impression, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts adopted a fact-intensive, case-by-case inquiry into the “predominant use” of the property.[1] The predominant use test was developed to address the point at which an owner forfeits homestead protection in the pursuit of commercial activity. The inquiry recognizes the ubiquity of the home office or boarder in modern residences. Bankruptcy Judge Elizabeth Katz’s recent opinion in In re Shove takes a fresh look at the Massachusetts Homestead Statute and rejects the predominant use inquiry as unnecessary and, in some cases, unduly burdensome on the homesteader.[2]

No More Zombie Class Actions: Supreme Court Stops Class Members from Filing Successive Class Claims after Expiration of Limitations Period

Jun 14 2018

By: Andrew C. Glass, Roger L. Smerage, Elma Delic

The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a plaintiff cannot file a class action outside the applicable statute of limitations merely because an unsuccessful prior class action tolled the limitations period for individual claims.[1] In China Agritech v. Resh,[2] the Court held that its prior jurisprudence “does not permit the maintenance of a follow-on class action past expiration of the statute of limitations.”[3] Rather, that jurisprudence only tolls the statute of limitations for unnamed class members to intervene in the action “individually or file individual claims if the class fails.”[4] In reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized that “[t]he Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure] provide a range of mechanisms to aid courts in” overseeing complex litigation, such as where individual claims are added on after a denial of class certification.[5] But, critically, “[w]hat the Rules do not offer is a reason to permit plaintiffs to exhume failed class actions by filing new, untimely class claims.”[6]

Shedding Some Light: SCOTUS Grants Cert. in Lamps Plus to Answer Question on State-Law Contract Interpretation and Class Arbitration

May 11 2018

By Andrew C. Glass, Robert W. Sparkes, III, Roger L. Smerage, Elma Delic

In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., [1] the U.S. Supreme Court held that “a party may not be compelled” under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) “to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.” [2] The Stolt-Nielsen Court found that an agreement that is silent on the availability of class arbitration does not provide sufficient evidence that the parties intended to submit to class, as opposed to individual, arbitration. [3] The Court, however, left open the question of what level of specificity an agreement must contain to demonstrate the parties’ consent to submit a dispute to class arbitration. [4]

The Door May Be Open, but the Ride Isn’t Free: Seventh Circuit Allows Data Breach Class Action to Survive Pleading Stage but Signals Tough Road Ahead for Plaintiffs

May 09 2018

By Andrew C. Glass, David D. Christensen, and Matthew N. Lowe

In Dieffenbach v. Barnes & Noble, Inc.,[1] the Seventh Circuit allowed a data breach class action to survive the pleadings stage, including a challenge to the plaintiffs’ standing. At the same time, the Court indicated that the plaintiffs may have a tough time proving their claims on the merits or establishing that class certification is warranted. That warning may put the brakes on this action as well as others brought on a similar theory of liability.

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Holds Passive Debt Buyers Are Not Debt Collectors Under Massachusetts Law

Apr 17 2018

By: Sean R. Higgins and Matthew N. Lowe

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently held in Dorrian v. LVNV Funding, LLC,[1] that “passive debt buyers” are not “debt collectors” required to be licensed under the Massachusetts Fair Debt Collection Practices Act[2] (“MDCPA”).

Dorrian is a class action lawsuit filed by borrowers in default who alleged that defendant LVNV Funding, LLC (“LVNV”) was operating as a debt collector without being licensed under the MDCPA.[3] Notably, the plaintiffs did not sue the third-party LVNV contracted with to handle all collection and servicing, which was licensed as a debt collector under the MDCPA. The trial court certified the class and granted summary judgment in the borrowers’ favor on their claims that LVNV violated the MDCPA by operating as an unlicensed debt collector.[4]

Risky Business: Whether an Increased Risk of Harm Supports Legal Standing in Data Breach Class Actions Continues to Divide Federal Courts of Appeals

Mar 26 2018

By: Andrew C. Glass, David D. Christensen, and Matthew N. Lowe

Every data breach class action in federal court must confront a threshold question: has the plaintiff alleged a sufficient “injury in fact” to establish Article III standing? The inquiry frequently focuses on whether a plaintiff has standing simply by pleading an increased risk of future injury from the theft of personal identifying information (PII). This is because many named plaintiffs do not––because they cannot––allege any present harm. The federal courts of appeals continue to weigh in on the issue of whether allegations of possible future harm suffice for Article III purposes. But far from providing clarity or consensus, recent appellate decisions have reached differing conclusions, which appear highly dependent on the nature of the facts alleged in each case.[1]

Catagory:Litigation & Enforcement Actions

The U.S. Supreme Court to Address Whether Counterclaim Defendants Can Remove Class Action Claims Under CAFA